



HM Government



The Scottish
Government
Riaghaltas na h-Alba

Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Guidance

Concept of Operations

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Nuclear operating site emergency - Concept of Operations

Introduction

1. This Concept of Operations (ConOps) sets out how national and local emergency responders may operate together to deliver an effective and consistent response to any radiation emergency at any nuclear civil or military operating site anywhere in the UK. Due to public sensitivities surrounding nuclear operations it is self-evident that any scale of incident at a nuclear site, which causes a radiological release will involve central government response arrangements. These arrangements, depending upon scale and impact, could include the provision of direction, co-ordination, expertise, or specialised equipment and financial support. However, local responders will be responsible for managing the primary effort to contain, control and ultimately recover from the consequences of any radiation emergency.
2. The approach within this ConOps is consistent with the emergency response duties and associated guidance set out by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and industry specific regulatory requirements covered by the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPPIR) and the Nuclear Installations Act 1965. So far as possible, radiation emergency response arrangements should be aligned with the practices that have evolved from the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004.

Purpose

3. The purpose of this document is to describe the UK response framework and associated capabilities that may be required in the event of a radiation emergency. It is intended to provide a consistent and structured approach in order to promote effective planning for, response to and recovery from any foreseeable radiation emergency by all stakeholders working in co-ordination to deliver common outcomes for the greater good.
4. The ConOps provides overarching direction to the National Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Guidance (NNEPRG). This in turn outlines the purpose and structure of emergency plans, covering both on and off site emergency arrangements and supporting national plans and the roles and responsibilities within them.

Scope

5. This document covers the guiding principles and phases of emergency management that may be applied at different levels of emergency response to manage a radiological risk arising from a nuclear source in the UK or overseas. Such sources within the UK may be civil nuclear facilities or Ministry of Defence (MoD) assets, such as nuclear reactors in naval vessels operating within UK territorial waters or special weapons in transit. Specifically, it sets out arrangements for responding to a nuclear emergency in:
 - England and Wales;
 - Scotland;
 - Near overseas (Europe), where the release of radiation into the environment may impact directly on the UK; and
 - Distant overseas (all other Global regions) where the focus will be on providing advice to UK nationals in affected countries including Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies.

6. The ConOps also covers the key objectives for responding to a radiation emergency and the response capabilities that may be needed. While the ConOps focuses on emergency response at any civil or MoD nuclear sites, the overall approach will inform emergency arrangements in response to any nuclear incident, apart from terrorist use of radiological material which is covered by the 2014 Potential CBRN(e) Incidents: A response Framework for the Emergency Services. Recovery from a nuclear attack is not covered within this document.

Radiation emergency - additional characteristics

7. As with any emergency situation, a radiation emergency will attract all of the usual characteristics commonly present within any consequence management scenario. However, there are two very specific and additional considerations that will need to be taken into account when planning and deploying a successful response to a radiation emergency. These are:
- Knowledge of Radiation and its Effects. The general population will not have a detailed knowledge of radiation and its effects on both the environment and humans. There is likely to be a particular fear and suspicion about anything connected to radiation. Consequently it will be necessary to gain and maintain public trust as soon as possible in order to avoid unnecessary fear spreading among the population; and
 - Effective Communication. While effective communication is important in any emergency situation, it is of paramount importance in a radiation emergency. This is not only to ensure that factually correct and informative messages are issued to the affected population, but that this is done in an expedient way that minimises the opportunity for partial or erroneous information from ill-informed sources to be used to fill an information vacuum. There is a fine balance to be maintained between waiting until critical information is fully validated and assessed, and taking vital opportunities to feed the voracious information appetite that will exist with both the affected population and global news media. Move too quickly and information may subsequently have to be retracted as the situation unfolds, move too slowly and public confidence will be lost and may never be fully regained.

Part 1 – Preparedness of the NNEPRG provides more detailed guidance on the nature of the risk from radiation emergencies.

Aim

8. To ensure that the UK's planning for and response to a nuclear emergency at home or overseas is effective, proportional and sustainable.
9. The following guiding principles have been developed to capture the core characteristics for the effective response to any nuclear incident. They are:
- Anticipation: In order to anticipate and manage the potential consequences of an emergency at a nuclear site, there is a need to identify risks and develop an assessment of both direct and indirect consequences, in order to inform understanding in advance of any emergency situation. In a civil nuclear context this is achieved primarily through the application of ONR's principles for the determination of the offsite emergency planning area;
 - Preparedness: All individuals and organisations that might have to respond to emergencies should be properly prepared. Such preparedness should include having clarity of roles and responsibilities, knowledge of specific emergency plans, such as the Operators On-Site Emergency Plan or the Local Authority's Off-Site Emergency Plan, or generic civil contingency plans produced by the Local

Resilience Forum / Resilience Partnership that might be used to support a response, and the opportunity to rehearse response arrangements periodically. Collective preparedness is sustained through routine interaction between emergency responders that promotes the maintenance of effective plans through sharing of information and learning from real incidents or exercises; participation in training and exercising is also key to future success. It is important that Local Resilience Forums are involved in this process to ensure that nuclear specific emergency plans dovetail with wider civil emergency arrangements;

- Continuity: The response to emergencies should be grounded within organisations' existing functions and their familiar ways of working – although inevitably, actions will need to be carried out at greater speed, on a larger scale and in more testing circumstances during any response to a radiation emergency;
- Subsidiarity: Decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level, with co-ordination at the highest necessary level. Immediate response on the nuclear site is the responsibility of the site operators. Local responders working through the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) are the foundation for an effective response to any emergency of any scale. Notwithstanding statutory duties, National authorities and agencies should provide support as required and requested to enable the local response to maximise its effectiveness;
- Direction: Clarity of purpose should be delivered through a common awareness of the strategic aims and supporting objectives for the response agreed at the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG). These should be agreed and understood by all involved in managing the response to a radiation emergency in order to effectively prioritise and focus the response effort;
- Integration: Effective co-ordination should be exercised between and within organisations both at the local and national levels of a response;
- Communication: Good two-way communications are critical to an effective response. Reliable and consistent information must be passed correctly and without delay between those who need to know, including the public. This is particularly important during any radiation emergency where an absence of definitive information will allow speculation and rumour to spread unchecked; and
- Co-operation: Positive engagement based on mutual trust and understanding will facilitate information-sharing and deliver effective solutions to arising issues.

Radiation emergency management phases

10. Managing any nuclear emergency comprises three main phases:

- Preparation (pre-planning). Preparing for radiation emergencies is an essential stage of managing any subsequent incident as it sets the conditions for the start of the response. Preparation covers the identification and training of people, the availability of infrastructure and equipment, the development of plans and operating procedures to guide coherent response activity and a validation process to ensuring these interlinked elements remain appropriate.

Further details on preparing for nuclear emergencies are set out in Part 1 - Preparedness of NNEPRG.

- Response (mitigating an immediate risk or stopping things getting worse). The response phase comprises two separate but closely-related and often overlapping challenges:

- Crisis management - this activity covers response actions that are aimed at preventing or averting a nuclear emergency developing further. These will be focused on intervention actions taken at the site by the operator and supported by local responders and other national agencies within the nuclear industry. These actions will be co-ordinated at the local level by the SCG with support from the national level - Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) or the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR) in Scotland; and
- Consequence (or impact) management – this takes place in parallel to crisis management and is concerned with steps taken to contain and control the probable impacts of a nuclear incident. It includes managing wider consequences such as the health of the public by implementing effective countermeasures. Consequence management is also known as 'Impact Management' and will be led by the SCG supported by national actions coordinated through COBR.

Further details on preparing for nuclear emergencies are set out in Part 2 - Response of NNEPRG.

- Recovery (a longer-term activity of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community) – This phase formally starts once the situation has been stabilized; i.e. the risk of further radiological release has been removed or reduced sufficiently for recovery to be warranted. However, preparation for the recovery phase will start at the SCC during the response phase with the formation of a Recovery Co-ordinating Group. Recovery from a nuclear emergency may be carried out at the local, national or UK level, depending on the scale of the event and its consequences. In contrast to the response phase, the recovery process can take a considerable amount of time (months or years), as it seeks to support affected communities in the restoration of the physical infrastructure and emotional, social, economic and physical wellbeing.

Further details on recovering from nuclear emergencies are set out in Part 3 - Recovery of NNEPRG.

Levels of nuclear emergency response

Note: Regardless of the potential severity of the event, any off-site radiation emergency would be treated as a national level response. COBR would stand up until such time as the nature of the emergency is assessed and codified. Thereafter COBR would stand-down having assessed the situation to be contained at Level 1. This is consistent with COBR Concept of Operation in response to any emergency that could impact on national wellbeing.

11. Site. The nuclear site operators play a fundamental role in the mitigation of the risk posed by nuclear operations. The plants are designed to reduce risk to as low a level as is reasonably practicable (ALARP) by the installation of multiple back-up systems. Detailed analysis of potential failure mechanisms that could lead to a release of radiological material are understood and operators are trained and exercised thoroughly to ensure appropriate mitigation measures can be promptly implemented. Should an event escalate to a point where a radiological release occurs or is considered imminent, then operators would enact authorised emergency procedures and practices to contain, control and halt any release of radiological material. Training and exercising for such an eventuality is conducted with local Emergency Services and Local Authorities and is regulated under Licence Condition 11 by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

12. Local. The local level of response is the basic building block to any emergency in the UK. Emergencies (or major incidents) are routinely handled by the local responders without the need for any significant central government involvement. However, in the event of a radiation emergency, pre-identified central government capabilities are immediately available to provide support. The local multi-agency response is co-ordinated through a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) located in the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC). Strategic decisions taken at the SCG are developed into collective response activities by a multi-agency Tactical Co-ordinating Group and are delivered at the incident scene through a Forward Control Point. The aim of local response co-ordination for a radiation emergency is to effectively manage the consequences of any radiation risk to reduce the risk of public exposure and harm to the environment.
13. National. The principle of subsidiarity emphasises the importance of local decision making supported, where appropriate, by co-ordination at a higher (central government) level. For clarity, there are three broad types (or levels) of emergency which are likely to require direct central government engagement but which are solely managed locally. These are:
- Significant emergency (Level 1) has a wider focus and requires central government involvement or support, primarily from a lead government department (LGD) - or a devolved administration, alongside the work of the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations. There is however no actual or potential requirement for fast, inter-departmental/agency, decision making which might necessitate the activation of the collective central government response, although in a few cases there may be value in using the COBR complex to facilitate the briefing of senior officials and ministers on the emergency and its management.
 - For example, a radiation emergency at a civil nuclear site that does not require immediate public protection countermeasures to be implemented beyond the site boundary.
 - Serious emergency (Level 2) has, or threatens, a wide and/or prolonged impact requiring sustained central government co-ordination and support from a number of departments and agencies and where appropriate, the devolved administrations. The central government response to such an emergency would be co-ordinated from the COBR, under the leadership of the lead government department.
 - For example, an emergency involving the release of radiation into the wider environment which requires the implementation of public protection countermeasures to be implemented within the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ), or a nuclear emergency overseas.
 - Catastrophic emergency (Level 3) has an exceptionally high and potentially widespread impact and requires immediate central government direction and support, such as a severe beyond design basis. Characteristics might include a top-down response in circumstances where the local response had been overwhelmed, or emergency powers were implemented to direct the response or requisition assets and resources. The Prime Minister would lead the co-ordination of the national response. Fortunately, the UK has had no recent experience of a Level 3 emergency, but it is important to be prepared for such an event should the need arise.
 - For example, a severe and prolonged nuclear emergency on the scale of Chernobyl or Fukushima, occurring within the UK.

Further information on emergency levels can be found in the central government's concept of operations¹.

International Levels - INES Scale

14. The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) is a worldwide tool for communicating to the public in a consistent way the safety significance of nuclear and radiological events. The INES scale uses 7 levels from Level 1 (anomaly) to Level 7 (major accident). Further detail is shown at Annex K in the Annex document.

Response strategy

15. The default objectives for any response strategy for a radiation emergency are to:
- Protect human life and, as far as possible, property and the environment;
 - Alleviate suffering;
 - Support the continuity of everyday activity and the restoration of disrupted services at the earliest opportunity; and
 - Uphold the rule of law and the democratic process.
16. To achieve these strategic objectives, local responders and agencies will co-ordinate their activities in order to:
- Deliver countermeasures appropriate to protect human life;
 - Issue public information releases covering urgent protective actions;
 - Determine need for implementation beyond the predetermined countermeasures area;
 - Agree and implement the radiation monitoring strategy and promulgate results;
 - Consider specialist advice;
 - Provide regular information updates to the affected communities; and
 - Engage with the operator to ensure an accurate situational awareness of the on-site situation.
17. To support these strategic objectives, central Government (including DAs, where appropriate) will:
- React with speed and decisiveness;
 - Respect local knowledge and decision-making wherever appropriate, without losing sight of the national strategy;
 - Prioritise access to scarce national resources;
 - Base policy decisions on the best available scientific evidence and ensure that the processes for providing scientific advice are widely understood and trusted;
 - Draw on existing legislation to respond effectively to the emergency and consider the need for additional powers;
 - Work with international partners when appropriate to share information and request assistance as necessary;

¹ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-central-government-s-concept-of-operations>

- Work with the local SCG to explain policies, plans and practices by communicating with interested parties (including the public) comprehensively, clearly and consistently, in a transparent and open way that addresses national and local concerns while encouraging and listening to feedback; and
 - Apply risk assessment methodology with appropriate cost benefit analysis to support decision-making at all levels.
18. These objectives are in no particular order of prominence. In reality they will evolve and their relative priority may be adjusted as the emergency develops. Also, some of these priorities may be unachievable at the outset of an emergency. The SCG and or Ministers will indicate the appropriate balance to strike in view of the prevailing circumstances at the time.

Response arrangements

19. This section outlines the functional elements needed to respond to a nuclear emergency. The Operational level of Activity includes not only first responders but also the response arrangements that the Site operator has available, together with any external specialist capabilities that the industry maintains to provide additional specialist advice to site operators.

Emergency Management

20. If a radiation emergency occurs within England, Wales or Scotland, dedicated crisis management structures are required to manage response activities. These structures are located at nuclear sites, within the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) / Resilience Partnership area, and at various locations nationally. Crisis management structures must be operational, and staffed by trained people, within one or two hours of any radiation emergency being declared. The facilities housing crisis management structures must be able to continue to function during any radiation emergency, hence their location must take account of likely radiological risk. Resilient communications links covering voice and data must also be available to ensure that crisis management facilities at various levels can share information effectively; key to this requirement is the need to have a pre-agreed approach to how information sharing will be achieved.
21. Structure. In Figure 1, the crisis management structure shown is flexible but will grow upwards from the local response managed from the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) which will be activated by the declaration of an off-site emergency. The LGD and COBR response will be activated if/when required. The primary function of the Government Liaison Team (GLT) is to act as a conduit for information flow between the SCG and LGD/COBR (as appropriate) and to anticipate resource and advice needs that are likely to emanate from the local responders.
22. Regional Co-ordination. A radiation emergency may affect more than one LRF / Resilience Partnership area. Multi-LRF/RP/SCG arrangements are detailed in Chapter 9 of Emergency Response and Recovery².

² See Emergency Response and recovery is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253488/Emergency_Response_andRecovery_5th_edition_October_2013.pdf. Multi-LRF/RP/SCG arrangements for Scotland are detailed in Preparing Scotland

23. Wales. If the location of the emergency is in Wales, or is likely to impact directly on Welsh territory, the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) will be advised and kept informed through their Emergency Co-ordination Centre. In such circumstances, WAG can be expected to provide additional representation within the GLT.




Figure 1. Response structures for England and Wales

24. Scotland. The situation in Scotland is consistent with the arrangements for England and Wales, as shown in Fig 2 below. However, Scottish Government would provide the central government response through the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR). Scottish Government is Lead Government Department (LGD) for all levels of civil nuclear incidents in Scotland and would support and supplement the efforts of local responders as necessary. For serious emergencies, the Scottish Government would expect to activate its SGoRR arrangements (similar to COBR in London). In the event that UK level arrangements are initiated, SGoRR would work with COBR, the Scotland Office and other relevant departments in Whitehall. Nevertheless, UK Central Government Departments and COBR, with their attendant capacities and capabilities, would be available to advise and support as required. The Scottish Government Liaison Officer (SGLO) would attend the Strategic Co-ordination Centre to support responders; help to ensure effective communication between responders and government; act as the principal contact for government officials or Scottish Ministers; participate in meetings with other agencies, liaise with SGoRR and provide general government-related advice and support. When a Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) is activated it would provide advice to and interact with the STAC and SGoRR.




Figure 2. Response structure for Scotland

25. International Co-ordination. In the event of a Radiation emergency in the UK DECC has been designated as the National Competent Authority (NCA). As such, irrespective of which department is the LGD, DECC would lead on engagement with multinational organisations such as the IAEA or EU to notify them of the radiological release and, where appropriate, request additional capability to support the UK's emergency response. DECC would also undertake initial notification of the emergency to countries with which we have relevant bi-lateral agreements, such as Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, France, Ireland, Norway and Russia.

UK Response and Coordination to Overseas Radiation Emergency

26. Near Overseas. If a radiation emergency occurs in European territory, which threatens to affect the UK or where assistance is sought from the UK government, a top down approach by central government will be adopted. COBR and/or a LGD would be activated to coordinate the national response, which may include the need to initiate local response arrangements at locations within the UK that may be threatened or directly affected. Acting on advice from SAGE, Central government would direct priorities and provide additional specialist resources where and when necessary.
27. Distant Overseas. Where a radiation emergency occurs at a civil nuclear site sufficiently distant to pose no direct adverse effect within the borders of UK territory, there may still be a threat to both expatriates, Overseas Territories, Crown Dependencies and importation of radiological contamination to the UK. In such a situation COBR is likely to be initiated to consider the implications for UK interests and set in place mitigation measures as advised by SAGE. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) would most likely be the co-ordinating Department for any UK response which may include contributions from OGDs including DECC, to provide appropriate specialist response capabilities and technical assistance to the affected area.

Part 2 - Response of NNEPRG provides guidance on response to overseas events.

Hazard Assessment

28. For any response to be effective, it is vital that information on the nature of the radiological hazard is made available to the SCG to inform timely decisions on response actions and to adjust pre-agreed immediate public protection measures that might have been automatically triggered. The same information must be made available to national emergency management structures that feed into COBR. It is important that the local information does not lag that available at the national level (and vice versa).
29. This information exchange will require agencies collecting radiological data from sensors at the site, local area and nationally, to be able to share information quickly and consistently. They will also need access to interpretation of the data in a way that informs local decisions on immediate response actions and national considerations about potential for escalation of the emergency.
30. While radiological data is an important part of any nuclear emergency "hazard assessment", at least as important (and arguably perhaps even more important) are the data on and analysis of, plant conditions. The radiological monitoring provides valuable information on what has already happened; but the plant data and its analysis provide information to inform projections about what is likely to happen in the future.
31. Radiation monitoring will be carried out during and after any radiation emergency for the following purposes:
- To inform activities associated with the immediate safety of people, including determination and confirmation of immediate public protection countermeasures, and provision of public reassurance;

- To establish environmental impact; and
 - To determine food countermeasures.
32. Environmental monitoring should be conducted to quickly confirm any release of radiation and then to subsequently determine the nature and extent of any contamination. Automated radiation detection systems in and around the site can provide immediate indications of abnormal radiation levels. Ground based sampling activities can identify the geographical spread of radiation.
33. Public health monitoring should be set up within 24hrs to provide reassurance to people who may have been in close proximity to the site.
34. Actual hazard information may be limited initially and thus predictions on the potential scale of the radiological impact will form the basis of initial information provided to crisis management locations. As more data from radiation monitoring activities becomes available, hazard assessments must be updated to ensure that decisions on emergency response are based upon actual information as soon as possible (within 4 to 6 hours) and that ensuing predictions are made with increasing confidence. All assessments will rely upon cross-agency collaboration in order to synthesise the wide range of available expertise, roles and information sources to produce consolidated and informed judgements. Once initiated, off-site survey action should be sustained until any release is contained and the final contamination picture is established.

Part 2 – Response of NNEPRG provides more detailed guidance on radiation monitoring and hazard assessment consideration.

Scientific Advice

35. The effective management of a radiation emergency will require access to specialist scientific and technical advice. During the response to a radiation emergency, local responders at the SCG will be advised by a Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) to provide timely and co-ordinated advice on scientific and technical issues.
36. The STAC is likely to be chaired by Public Health England (PHE) or the Director of Public Health (DPH) public health agencies in England and Wales, and relevant NHS Board (Director of Public Health in Scotland). The site operator will initially provide technical advice to the SCG. The STAC, once initiated, will provide independent science and technical advice using all available resources, including Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), Environment Agency (EA), Food Standards Agency (FSA) etc., to the SCG.
37. At the national level, Lead Government Departments are responsible for ensuring they have effective arrangements in place to access technical and scientific advice in a timely manner during an emergency situation. The establishment of a Science Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) would normally provide such advice. For a radiation emergency, regardless of level, decisions on activating a SAGE would be taken by Cabinet Office in consultation with the Government Office for Science and the nominated LGD.
38. When activated in support of the central response, the SAGE would provide co-ordinated scientific and technical advice to COBR and LGD so that rounded, evidence based advice can be presented to decision makers. It should be borne in mind that the individual membership of the local STAC will invariably share a parent organisation with many of the SAGE members. These individuals in both organisations should respect the principle of integrated working as specified above.
39. The interaction between STAC and SAGE is important to maintain clarity of advice being provided to local responders and central government. This is achieved by STAC and

SAGE Chairs maintaining routine contact during the emergency in order to share all relevant available information. The principal focus of SAGE advice would be on longer term consequences while the STAC would focus on shorter term implications for public protection. However, SAGE will work continuously to update and provide assurance of all scientific advice offered to decision makers.

Parts 2 and 3 of NNEPRG provide more detailed information on expected STAC & SAGE activities during the response and recovery phases of an emergency.

Public Health Protection

40. Public protection measures used to protect the public in the event of a radiation emergency follow 3 principles:
- Justification - The countermeasure should be used if it is expected to achieve more good than harm;
 - Optimisation - The quantities criteria used for introducing and withdrawing countermeasures optimises public protection;
 - Avoid Deterministic Effects - Use countermeasures to keep doses to levels below thresholds for deterministic effects.
41. Emergency Reference Levels (ERL) of doses issued by Public Health England (PHE) should be used to justify countermeasures to protect the public. It may be appropriate, depending upon the nature of the radiological risk from the site, to pre-agree a range of public protection countermeasures to ensure that they can be delivered in a timely manner. Public protection measures must be continually reviewed by the SCG during any radiation emergency and adjusted to match the risk or actual hazard identified through environmental monitoring. Public protection measures usually cover sheltering people, with the provision of stable iodine relevant to the risk, and evacuation.

NNEPRG Parts 1- Preparedness and 2 - Response provide further information about public health considerations.

Information Sharing

42. An integrated approach to sharing and retaining information related to any radiation emergency is required to ensure that crisis managers at the site, local and national levels have access to the same information when making collective decisions on multi-agency response. The technical solutions to facilitate this need not be the same across all agencies but they must allow information to be shared quickly and simply with minimal interaction by emergency responders. Similarly, agencies are likely to retain discrete information management systems to help manage internal response activity. The nature of information likely to be shared to support multi-agency response arrangements may cover:
- The Common Recognised Picture;
 - Hazard assessment – visualization and interpretation;
 - Key collective decisions and actions; and
 - Key crisis management documents – minutes and media statements.

NNEPRG Parts 1- Preparedness and 2 - Response provide more detailed guidance about the critical requirements for information sharing during an emergency.

Media Communications

43. An accurate, timely and consistent flow of information to the public and other key stakeholders is essential to maintain confidence in the response to an emergency and

for influencing public behaviour. The lead government department will activate a Nuclear Emergency Media and Communications Team who will lead on public presentation in support of the lead minister. However, where an emergency has wide ranging impacts or gives rise to considerable public and media interest, the News Co-ordination Centre (NCC) will be activated. This facility is always in place whenever COBR is activated, but it may also be initiated to support the lead government department in response to a level 1 emergency.

44. The national public information process will be supported by local media co-ordination activity conducted at the SCC. This will be focused at providing localised information and advice to protect the public and to reinforce key national messages about the management of the radiation emergency.

Part 2 – Response of NNEPRG provides further guidance about the conduct of media communications during an emergency.

Validation & assurance

45. Training and exercising are a means of validating and assuring plans for radiation emergency response. This is a requirement under the 2001 REPPiR legislation which is regulated by the Office for Nuclear Regulation.

Further information about training, exercising and lesson learning processes are contained in NNEPRG Part 1 - Preparedness.

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